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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH
SHIRLEY RAY RICHARDS,
DELORES R. MERKLEY, and
GORDON A. RICHARDS
Plaintiffs-Respondents,
vs.

]
]
]
]i

Case No. 860536

]I
1

Priority
Category No. 13b

VERNON RICHARDS,
Defendant-Appellant.

]

REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANT/DEFENDANT VERNON RICHARDS
ARGUMENT
I.
THE WILLIAMS CONTRACT RECEIVABLE WAS NOT
AN ASSET OF THE ESTATE OF LLOYD RICHARDS.
The essential issue presented by this case focuses on
the identity of the assets belonging to the respective estates
of Lloyd and Bertha Richards.

Each of them died testate,

leaving a Last Will and Testament providing that their estates
would be divided equally among their four children.

If the

Williams contract receivable were an asset of the estate of
Lloyd Richards, then it ought to be divided equally among the
four children.

If the receivable were assigned to Vernon

Richards prior to Lloyd's death, then it is not an asset of the
estate and belongs solely to Vernon Richards.

The issue is

thus whether the receivable belonged to the estate of Lloyd
Richards at his death.

The evidence below was undisputed that Lloyd Richards
executed an Assignment of Contract (Exhibits 34 and 36)
assigning to Vernon Richards all of Lloyd Richards' right,
title, and interest to the Uniform Real Estate Contract with
Robert Williams.

(Tr. Vol. Ill, at 11-12.)

Lloyd Richards

further had Vernon Richards' name substituted for his own on
the escrow account at First Security Bank into which Mr.
Williams made his payments on the contract.

The bank, in turn,

forwarded the payments so received to Vernon Richards.

(Tr.

Vol. Ill, at 14-19.)
In their brief, plaintiffs claim that "the evidence is
clear and convincing that Lloyd Richards intended that his
estate should be divided equally among his children."
(Respondents' brief, at 25.)

Vernon Richards does not dispute

that fact, for it is provided clearly in Lloyd Richards' Last
Will and Testament.

The Williams contract receivable, however,

was not an asset of Lloyd Richards estate, having been assigned
to Vernon Richards prior to Lloyd Richards' death.
Throughout their brief, plaintiffs observe that the
lower court found "by clear and convincing evidence" that the
Williams contract receivable constituted an asset of Lloyd
Richards estate.

Plaintiffs ignore almost entirely, however,

the fact that the contract was assigned to Vernon Richards
prior to Lloyd Richards' death,.

-9-

The only arguments brought by

plaintiffs against the validity of the Assignment of Contract
are:

(1) there was no consideration; and (2) the Assignment

was void because Vernon Richards was in a confidential
relationship with Lloyd Richards (Respondents' brief, at
23-25.)

These points are addressed below.

A.

The Assignment of Contract is supported by
consideration or, in the alternative, constitute a
valid gift from Lloyd Richards to Vernon Richards.
In their brief, plaintiffs contend that "[t]he

transfers and transactions between the deceased parents and
Appellant show no consideration running from Appellant to
parent."

(Respondents' brief at 23.)

Plaintiffs are

presumably here referring to the Assignment of Contract.

This

assertion, however, is contrary to the plain language of
paragraph 1 of the Assignment of Contract (Exhibit 36) which
states:
That the assignors in consideration of the
Payment of Ten Dollars and other good and
valuable consideration, the receipt of which is
hereby acknowledged, assign to the assignees,
all their right, title and interest in and to
said above described property as evidenced by the
aforesaid Uniform Real State Contract of August
5, 1975 concerning the above described property.
(Emphasis added.)
No evidence vis presented at the trial to rebut the
assertion in the Assignment of Contract that Vernon Richards
paid ten dollars to L3oyd Richards in consideration.

Moreover,

as argued in Vernon Richard's initial brief, the recitation of
consideration in the Assignment is sufficient to make it
enforceable even if the consideration recited was never
actually received.

(Appellant's brief, at 16-17.)

Vernon

Richards additionally argued, in the alternative, that the
assignment constituted a valid inter vivos gift from Lloyd
Richards to Vernon Richards.

(Appellant's brief, at 17.)

Accordingly, the lower court's finding that the
Williams Contract receivable constituted an asset of Lloyd
Richard's estate was not supported by any evidence, let alone
clear and convincing evidence, and must be reversed.
B.

The existence of a confidential relationship between
Vernon Richards and Lloyd Richards was not raised or
argued in the lower court and cannot be considered as
an issue on appeal.
In their brief, for the first time, plaintiffs claim

that a confidential relationship existed between Vernon
Richards and Lloyd Richards, which "creates a presumption that
the transaction is unfair and shifts the burden of proving that
it was a fair transaction from the Respondents to Appellant."
(Respondent's brief, at 24.)

This issue was never raised or

argued before the trial court and cannot be considered on
appeal.

In Bundy v. Century Equipment Co., 692 P.2d 754 (Utah

1984), this Court held that "matters neither raised in the
pleadings nor put in issue at the trial cannot be considered

-4-

for the first time on appeal."

Id. at 758.

Plaintiffs failed

to raise the issue of the existence of a confidential
relationship either in their pleadings or at trial and cannot
belatedly raise those questions for the first time in this
appeal.
Even if this issue is considered on its merits, the
evidence was.ample that the transaction between Lloyd Richards
and Vernon Richards was untainted by any relationship between
Vernon Richards and his father and was not the result of undue
influence.

The evidence showed that Lloyd Richards had been

very upset with how plaintiffs had handled the distribution of
Bertha's estate.

(Tr. Vol. II, at 145-48.)

He was upset

because plaintiffs had borrowed significant sums from their
parents and Vernon had not borrowed anything, and he felt that
Vernon was being treated unfairly.
Following Bertha's death, Lloyd called Vernon Richards
on the telephone and invited him to come to Vernal.

Vernon and

his daughter-in-law, Betty Richards, drove to Vernal where
Lloyd stated that he wanted to assign to Vernon the Williams
contract and also make him a joint tenant on the two checking
accounts at First Security Bank and Zions First National Bank,
taking Delores Merkley's name off the accounts.

According to

Vernon Richards, his father "was unhappy with the way that -some of the things that Delores was doing," (Tr. Vol. II., at

143), including taking things out of the house after Bertha's
death.

(Tr. Vol. II, at 144-45.) Lloyd Richards also believed

that plaintiffs had taken papers from his home, including
promissory notes that they had signed payable to their
parents.

(Tr. Vol. II, at 141.)
Being disturbed by the conduct of his daughter, Lloyd

made the arrangements for the Assignment of Contract to be
prepared by his attorney, John C. Beaslin, and executed it. He
also caused Vernon's name to be placed on the two checking
accounts and the escrow account at First Security Bank into
which the Williams contract receivable was paid.

He made

arrangements for Vernon to visit the banks and sign the
signature cards.

There was no evidence that Vernon Richards

suggested this procedure or took advantage of his father.
Lloyd Richards initiated the transactions on his own and saw
them through to their conclusion.
Moreover, plaintiff Delores Merkley is hardly in a
position to claim that Vernon Richards exerted undue influence
on his father.

It can certainly be argued that she was in a

confidential relationship with her mother, Bertha Richards. As
plaintiffs admit in their brief, Mrs. Merkley "helped her
mother in dividing up her estate and making the allocations."
(Respondents' brief, at 6.)

In fact, Delores lived three miles

from her mother and saw her every night after it was discovered

that Bertha had a brain tumor,

(Tr. Vol. II, at 66.)

Bertha

placed a great deal of confidence in Delores, whom she trusted
to handle her financial affairs.

Delores wrote a check on

Bertha's account for $50,922.24, to purchase the certificates
for the children.

(Tr. Vol. II, at 66-67; Exhibit 9.)

Delores

also wrote all of the notes dealing with the disposition of
Bertha's estate, Exhibit 8.

It is clear from the evidence that

Delores was in a confidential relationship with Bertha and did
in fact exert significant influence over her.
Because the issue of confidential relationships and
undue influence was not raised below, it ought not to be
considered.

To the extent that this Court does consider it, it

ought to consider also the evidence of undue influence on the
part of Delores Merkley.
II.
THE TWO JOINT CHECKING ACCOUNTS PASSED TO
VERNON RICHARDS, AS THE SURVIVING JOINT
TENANT, ON THE DEATH OF LLOYD RICHARDS.
The evidence at the trial was not controverted that
Vernon Richards was a joint tenant with Lloyd Richards on the
two checking accounts at First Security Bank and at Zions First
National Bank.

As argued in his initial brief, the-Utah

Multiple-Party Accounts statute, Utah Code Ann. § 75-6-104(1)
(1978), provides that, on the death of a joint tenant, all sums
remaining in a joint account pass by operation of law to the

surviving joint tenant "unless there is clear and convincing
evidence of a different intention at the time the account is
created."

The lower court held that the sums contained in the

two joint accounts constituted assets of Lloyd Richards'
estate.

There was no evidence, let alone clear and convincing

evidence, of an intention on the part of Lloyd Richards that
those sums would remain in his estate at the time the joint
tenancy with Vernon Richards was created.

As indicated above,

the only evidence at trial concerning Lloyd Richards intent
came from the testimony of Vernon Richards and Betty Richards
that Lloyd Richards was upset with how his wife's estate had
been handled and thought that Vernon Richards had been treated
unfairly.
parents.

Each of plaintiffs had borrowed money from their
Vernon and his wife had borrowed very little.

(Tr.

Vol. II, at 147-48.) He also was upset because Delores Merkley
had taken things from the house following Bertha's death.
The case of Culley v. Culley, 17 Utah 2d 62, 404 P.2d
657 (1965), cited by plaintiffs, is distinguishable.

In that

ase, the son of the decedent had signed as a joint tenant on a
savings account and claimed a right of survivorship in the
account following his father's death.

The Supreme Court

affirmed the lower court ruling that it had never been intended
that the son have an interest in the account while he was
alive, holding that the evidence was clear and convincing.

Id. at 659. The opinion in Culley was handed down prior to
the adoption in 19 75 of the Multiple-party Accounts statute,
Utah Code A m i

§ ?5 6 *

'

1 Indei 11 ii s st ' a 1:t 11 e , 11 HE • ques t ion

is whether the decedent intended something other than that the
sums in I be joint account should pass t <• *-V- surviving tenant
i rliH.it li

.-*•

In t IN- pie *. '

:.* . . *-is no evidence of a

contrary intention on the ; r: of Lloyd Richards when the joint
tenancy was established.
In thei x br i ef, plaintiffs repeat the lower courts
finding that Lloyd Richards intended the two checking accounts,
and the other assets in dispute, to constitute asset *;. i,| Ins
f-state !• L«* livi.it d equally.

Plaintiffs refer I. c i the "conduct

i the parties 11 and the "conduct of the decedents, ff
(Respondent's brief, at 25) as supporting the eour l,fs
determination that Vernon Richards was made a joint, tenant on
the accounts merely so that he could act as a fiduciary "in
handling of the property

in !;, I

•

laitls t\statt for 1 he

benefit of himself and his brothers and sister."

Id.

Nowhere

::i n their brief, however, do plaintiffs describe the conduct to
which they are referring,

T'laint i 1" f s point

In nn pvideiu.t'

m

the record of any intention on the part of Lloyd Richards other
than that

wanted :, *;

tl: le si-

'• ;. •

n Vernon the Williams Contract and
•

statements are merely conclusory
and convincing evidence.

i\'i.\i accoi mts.

Plaintiffs'

;i d are unsupported by clear

Accordingly, this court should hold that sums
remaining on deposit in the First Security Bank and Zions First
National Bank checking accounts passed to Vernon Richards as
the surviving joint tenant by operation of law at the death of
Lloyd Richards.
III.
BERTHA RICHARDS DID NOT MAKE VALID INTER VIVOS GIFTS
OF THE CERTIFICATES PRIOR TO HER DEATH.
As argued in Point IV/C of Vernon Richards' initial
brief, Bertha Richards' attempt to make an inter vivos gift of
certificates to her children was invalid because the
certificates were not delivered prior to her death.
is an essential element of an inter vivos gift.

Delivery

Because the

certificates were never delivered to Bertha Richards' children,
the sums on deposit constituted assets of Bertha Richards'
estate, to be divided equally.
In their brief, plaintiffs ignore this defect in the
lower court's ruling.

Plaintiffs make no effort to respond to

any of the authorities cited by Vernon Richards in his brief,
which state clearly that delivery is an essential element in
making an inter vivos gift.

Because this element was missing,

this Court should hold that ironey represented by the
certificates were assets of Bertha Richards' estate and should
be divided evenly between the four children.

-10-

As argued in

Vernon Richards' initial brief, this would require Delores
Mertlev

tn fuw t I ^ i u"i ot

',' .' ,000 Ofi in W nri m R i c h a r d s , Gordon

"Laddy" Richards $ 6 , 0 0 0 . 0 0 , and S h i r l e y Richards

$3,000.00.

IV
LOWER COURT'S HOLDING THAT VERNON RICHARDS
IS A TRUSTEE OF A TRUST IS IN ERROR.
its Findings oi Fact and Conclusions of Law, the
lower court referred to Vernon Richards as a "trustee."
their brief, plaintiffs also take the- positic
Ri chards i s a trustee of a trust
by the evidence.

In

that Veri. 101

rinding is unsupported

Each of the wills of Lloyd and Bertha

Richards appointed Vernon Richards ns executor and f .1 dur 1,»1 y
over the respective estates

No mention is made of the

establishment of any trust or the appointment of Vernon
Richards as a tr\ is tee

Thei e v *

-t •

.:'

Lloyd or Bertha Richards ever established any trust.
In arguing that jurisdiction over this matter was
proper ii„, the Third

ludi. 1 a I Djstr' * 'Vmirt l:m Sail Lake

County, plaintiffs cite provisions

the Uniform Probate Code

dealing with trusts, Utah Code Ann. §§ 75-7-201, 75-7-205,
75-7- 20!* . These sect2 01 is are not applicable, however, because
Vernon Richards is not a trustee and no trust was ever
established.

V.
THE PARTIES DID NOT ENTER INTO ANY
AGREEMENT CONCERNING THE SETTLEMENT
OF THE ESTATE OF BERTHA RICHARDS.
In their brief, plaintiffs assert that the parties
entered into an agreement following the death of Bertha
Richards regarding the distribution of her estate.

The lower

court also found that the heirs of Bertha Richards "accepted
the distribution" of Bertha's estate.

(R. 207.)

Plaintiffs

claim that by accepting and cashing checks from Shirley and
Gordon "Laddy" Richards, Vernon Richards impliedly agreed that
that constituted his full share of his mother's estate.

This

argument is flawed on the grounds that the money so paid had
come from the certificates prepared by Bertha Richards prior to
her death, which were never delivered to her children and
constituted an invalid attempt to make an inter vivos gift.
Thus, all the sums represented by the certificates must be paid
back into the estate of Bertha Richards to be divided evenly
according to Bertha's will.
Moreover, it was undisputed that no agreement or
resolution was reached at the meeting following Bertha's death
and that the meeting was brought to an abrupt close-because of
a failure to reach an agreement.
testified.

Each of the parties so

(Tr. Vol. I, at 57; Tr. Vol II, at 25; Tr. Vol. II,

at 91; Tr. Vol. II, at 148.)

Vernon Richards did accept the
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checks tendered to him by Shirley Richards a week later in Salt
Lake city, but tlw-. i> U«J - MM evidtiH,tj tit lri.il M M

* y

agreement was reached between the parties at that time.
Shirley Richards testified that there was no conversation with
Vernon, R i cl lai ds \ ?1 lei i h e 1 € ft: til le tw :> cl leeks
25 2.6.) V e r n o n R i c h a r d s s i m i l a r l y t e s t i f i e d .
149-50,
Prob '
writing.

\I r

Vu i , 1 i , at

(Jr. V o l , 1 ] , at

-.t:. had the matter been discussed, the Utah Uniform
•.

.*••••:

e

, - -

ture must be in

Utah Code Ann. § ?5 - 3 - 912 provides:
Subject to the rights of creditors and taxing
authorities, competent successors may agree among
themselves to alter the interests, shares, or
amounts to which they are entitled under the will
of the decedent, or under the laws of intestacy,
in any way that they provide in a written
contract executed by all who are affected by its
provisions.

(Emphasis added.)
This provision was intended to prevent the kind of
situation presented in the present case.

Otherwise, an heir to

an estate would be at risk every t:i no.e h e a c c e p t e c l a part:i a 1
p a y m e n t f r o m t h e e s t a t e a n d w o u l d be s u b j e c t to t h e c l a i m that
by a c c e p t i n g t h e p a y m e n t 1 le w a s a g r e e i n g that he" w a s not
e n t i t l e d to a n y t h i n g f u r t h e r ,

In Hto present c a s e , tl lere \ ?as

no written agreement or contract between the parties and this
Court should hold that the lower court was in error in holding
that t he j > art i es ag i eed a n i o i i g t h e m s e ] v e s co i I c e r i 11ng 11 I e
d i s t r i b u t i o n r-f t h e e s t a t e o f B e r t h a R i c h a r d s .

VI.
THE PLEADINGS IN THIS CASE WERE PROPERLY AMENDED
TO CONFORM TO THE EVIDENCE.
Plaintiffs draw attention to Vernon Richard's Answer,
in which he admitted having possession of certain assets that
belonged to the Estate of Lloyd Richards, these papers and
documents, some of which were introduced into evidence
(Exhibits 2, 3, 4, 8, 10, 24), included certain promissory
notes payable to Lloyd and Bertha Richards by plaintiffs and
others, and deeds to real property in Vernal, Utah.
UH 4-9.)

(Answer,

In paragraph 8 of his Answer, Vernon Richards

admitted that he had received certain payments owed to the
Estate of Lloyd Richards.

Vernon Richards denied each and

every other allegation contained in paragraph 8 of the
Complaint.
Nowhere in his Answer does Vernon Richards admit that
he is holding the money paid by First Security Bank from the
Williams Escrow as a trustee or fiduciary of the estate of
Lloyd Richards.

At the trial, the court ruled that, to the

extent that the evidence was inconsistent with the pleadings,
the pleadings should be amended to conform to the evidence,
pursuant to Rule 15(b)- Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.
Vol. Ill, at 51-52.)

(Tr.

Counsel for plaintiffs made no objections

at the trial to the evidence put on by Vernon Richards that the

m o n e y paid from the Williams escrow belonged to himself
i,:

p- -^--

. mil tin Jif^sei (it i'he* estai"e,

"That issue

h a v i n g b e e n tried w i t h the express or implied consent of
p l a i n t i f f s , the court w a s required u n d e r R u l e 15(1 ) to amend
the pleadi ngs to coi if or in to the evidence .

General Insurance

C o . of A m e r i c a v. Carnicero Dynasty C o r p . , 545 P.2d 502 (Utah
1976).

Plaintiffs w e r e not p r e j u c i i c e c | by the amendment and, in

f a c t , wt'i" jlluwed by the court to introduce additional
d o c u m e n t a r y evidence a w e e k after the trial was closed.

(Tr.

V o l . I l l , en. ^-r. ;
The issue is w h e t h e r L l o y d Richards validly assigned
to V e r n o n the right to receive the payments due u n d e r the
W i l l i a m s contract.

The rvnleru'e IN undisputed tluit 1 lit

A s s i g n m e n t of Contract w a s executed and m a i n t a i n e d w i t h the
e s c r o w documents at First Security B a n k .

The b a n k was not

u n c e r t a i n ov e r who wa s e i I t i 1 1 e ci t: o t: 1: ie m o i ie ;> p a i d by Wi 11 i ams .
T h e b a n k paid al] of the money directly to V e r n o n R i c h a r d s in
his individual capacity and not as a representative of the
estate.
The A s s i g n m e n t of Contract was p r e p a r e d and w i t n e s s e d
by Johi i C. B e a s l i n , counsel :>• r B e r t h a and Lloyd Richards inn
Vernal

Presumab

.'...; have indicated on t he

A s s i g n m e n t of Contract that the assignment
r e c e i v a b l e w a s b e i n g m a d e to V e r n o n Richard

f the W i l l i a m s
i fidnciar;

or

representative capacity had that been Lloyd Richard's intent.
The Assignment of Contract makes no such declaration, but
merely assigns the contract receivable to Vernon Richards in
his individual capacity.
VII.
THE FINDING OF THE LOWER COURT THAT THERE ARE
NO CREDITORS TO THE ESTATES OF LLOYD AND
BERTHA RICHARDS IS UNSUPPORTED BY THE EVIDENCE.
The lower court entered a conclusion of law that
"there are no creditors of the estates of Bertha Richards or
Lloyd Richards."

(R. 217.)

This point was argued by

plaintiffs in their brief, at 22.
There was unrebutted evidence, however, that the
Internal Revenue Service claimed to be owed debts by the
estates of Lloyd and Bertha Richards.
Vol. Ill, at 26-28.)

(Tr. Vol. II, at 141-42;

Vernon Richards would testify at the

present time that, subsequent to the trial, the IRS has
continued to make demands upon the estates for payment of taxes
that are claimed to be due and owing.
To the extent that the estates of Lloyd and Bertha
Richards do in fact owe taxes to the IRS or to other taxing
authorities, Vernon Richards, as the executor of their estates,
should be entitled to utilize such assets of the estates as
remain in order to pay the taxes.

If such assets are

insufficient, Vernon Richards should

e allowed to seek

contribution from plaintiffs for their share of the taxes that
are so owed

Accordingly, V e r n o n Richards urges this Court to

re verse l ix

-.

of the estate.

cour t's finding that there are no creditors

V e r n o n Richards is further entitled to an order

of this Court entitling him to pa y such ciehl s

are

legitimately owed and to obtain contribution, ,: necessary,
from p l a i n t i f f s .
'. V I I I . ,.
THE DEBTS OWED TO LLOYD RICHARDS BY HIS
CHILDREN WERE NOT V A L I D L Y FORGIVEN.
In his initial b r i e f , V e r n o n Richards argued, at point
V / B that the lower court committed error in holding that Lloyd
*

-

••

: . t i n t i f fs .

In their b r i e f , plaintiffs do not: respond to the argument of
V e r n o n Richards and make 110 effort to address the argument and
ai 111 ior11: i e s c o n 1: a J i Ieci 11 ie rein.

Accordingly , thi s Court should

hold that the lower court committed error in concluding that
Lloyd Richards validly forgave debts owed to him by p l a i n t i f f s .
CONCLUSION
In their b r i e f , w h i c h consists generally of conclusory
a s s e r t i o n s , plaintiffs appear unable to point to any evidei ice
i i I t .1 le • t ecord supporting thp-'r contention that Lloyd Richards
intended V e r n o n Richards
Contract and the sums

receive the money from the Williams

. - " • • ed :i i I 11 Ie j oi i :it accoi :ints a 1: "f :i r s t

Security Bank and Zions First National Bank as a fiduciary for
his estate.

The lower court erred in holding that those funds

were assets of Lloyd Richards estate.

Plaintiffs failed to

respond to the statutory and case authority cited by Vernon
Richards in his initial brief.

Moreover, plaintiffs do not

respond to the arguments in Vernon Richards* brief that the
motor home was validly given to Vernon Richards by his father;
that debts owed to Lloyd Richards by his children were not
validly forgiven by him; and that the certificates prepared by
Bertha Richards prior to her death were not delivered to her
children and did not constitute valid inter vivos gifts.

The

checking accounts at First Security Bank and Zions First
National Bank passed by operation of law to Vernon Richards, as
the surviving joint tenant, pursuant to the Utah Multiple-Party
Accounts statute.

The lower court's finding to the contrary

was unsupported by any evidence, let alone clear and convincing
evidence as required by the act.

Accordingly, Vernon Richards

urges this Court to reverse the judgment of the lower court.
DATED this (3 ' d a y of July, 1987.
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